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Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and 
the Constitutional Protection of 
Religion 
Benjamin L. Berger 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some of the most elemental aspects of modern criminal justice have 
their foundation in the relationship between law and religion. The jury, a 
central component of our imaginary — even if not so prevalent in our 
lived reality — of criminal justice in Canada, arose when, at the Fourth 
Lateran Council in 1215, the Pope forbade clergy from participating in 
the ordeals.1 Ordeals were necessary because it was inconceivable for one 
man to stand in mortal judgment (and in this period in the development 
of the Western legal tradition, most criminal judgment was a mortal 
matter) of another. Only God had the authority to pass such judgment 
and the ordeals were the means of discerning God’s will. Without the 
clergy the ordeals were impossible and without the ordeals there appeared 
to be no means of administering criminal justice. A new form of ordeal, the 
jury trial, filled the gap thus created in the administration of criminal justice. 
We carry forward, largely unacknowledged, this religious foundation in 
the systemic design of the modern Canadian criminal trial. 
This deep religious influence touches our core substantive commitments 
in criminal justice as well. James Whitman has recently shown that the 
origins of the “reasonable doubt” standard can be traced to a theological 
concern for protecting the souls of the jurors.2 To sit in judgment of and 
convict another individual was always a potential mortal sin; to allay jurors’ 
fears — and, hence, to encourage conviction — they were reassured 
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1 
Benjamin L. Berger, “Criminal Appeals as Jury Control: An Anglo-Canadian Historical 
Perspective on the Rise of Criminal Appeals” (2005) 10:1 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 1. 
2 
James Q. Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal 
Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
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that, as long as they held no reasonable doubt, their souls would be safe. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt — originally a device of theological 
and moral comfort — has not only been constitutionalized through section 
11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,3 but has been 
described as the “silver thread” that runs alongside the golden thread of 
the presumption of innocence, “forever intertwined in the fabric of 
criminal law”.4 Again, only fleetingly glimpsed and sparingly discussed, 
the interaction of criminal law and religion continues to strongly inform 
our modern conception of criminal justice. 
The introduction of the Charter in 1982 brought about a revolution 
in the procedural, evidentiary and substantive components of criminal 
justice in Canada. Indeed, the textual heart of the Charter is concerned 
with legal rights surrounding the criminal process and a good deal of ink 
has flown from some very fine pens revealing and analyzing the ways in 
which the Charter has fundamentally affected the administration of 
criminal justice in Canada.5 The story of the Charter’s impact on the rich 
historical relationship between law and religion has not yet, however, 
been told. In some ways, given the examples that I have cited, this is not 
surprising. The jury trial and the demand for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt have unmoored from their religious bases and the question, though 
interesting as an historical matter, may seem of little contemporary 
moment. There is, however, a way in which this absence of reflection on 
the post-Charter interaction of criminal law and the constitutional status 
of religion is conspicuous and, with certain questions of substantive 
criminal law and religion appearing on the horizon, increasingly so. 
The hidden but abiding tension that I am positing between substantive 
criminal law and religious freedom and equality is really rather neat and 
can be sharply put. When one takes a conceptual step back, one sees that 
the constitutional protection of religious freedom and substantive criminal 
law are both centrally concerned with the role of the state in making and 
enforcing moral judgments, but are contesting this boundary from opposite 
directions. On the one hand, the constitutional protection of religious 
                                                                                                            
3
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11, [hereinafter “the Charter”]. 
4
 R. v. Lifchus, [1997] S.C.J. No. 77, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 320, at para. 27 (S.C.C.). 
5
 See, e.g., Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Scarborough, 
ON: Thomson Carswell, 2005); Kent Roach, “Twenty Years of the Charter and Criminal Justice:  
A Dialogue Between a Charter Optimist, a Charter Realist, and a Charter Sceptic” (2003) 19 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 39; James Stribopoulos, “Has Everything Been Decided? Certainty, the Charter and Criminal 
Justice” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 381; Alan Brudner, “Guilt under the Charter: The Lure of 
Parliamentary Supremacy” (1998) 40:3-4 Crim. L.Q. 287. 
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freedom and equality, a now-orthodox component of any modern 
constitutional democracy, is, at core, the quintessential reflection of the 
modern liberal demand that the state remain withdrawn from the domain 
of moral judgments and claims about the good life. At its most obvious 
level, this constraint precludes the state from imposing a particular religious 
view. More foundationally, however, section 2(a) of the Charter reflects 
the notion that beliefs and actions linked to judgments that flow from 
one’s sense of the order of things should be left untouched by government. 
The inclusion of religion as a listed prohibited ground for state-imposed 
inequality underscores this commitment and reflects the historical tendency 
for state power to forget this admonition to the detriment of its religious 
citizens. On the other hand, the substantive criminal law is precisely a 
domain of moral judgment. It is a field not only concerned with notions 
of individual moral blame, but one whose very conceptual foundation is 
that society can judge certain actions to be so morally repugnant as to 
warrant state actions with fearsome consequences for the individual. As 
frankly conceded in the list of permissible ends of the federal criminal 
law power,6 and despite certain contemporary arguments about the moral 
neutrality of modern criminal law to the contrary, whatever else the 
criminal law is doing — and it is always doing many things — it is a 
domain of law that uses the power of the state to enforce basic societal 
claims about morality. At this level of analysis, the constitutional 
protection of religious conscience and the substantive criminal law have 
been on a conceptual collision course. 
The post-Charter silence surrounding these dimensions of our public 
law commitments is, from this perspective, somewhat remarkable. This 
is particularly so given the pre-Charter history of Anglo-Canadian 
criminal law, which includes the famous Hart-Devlin debate7 and cases 
                                                                                                            
6
 The criminal law’s power to enforce basic societal claims about morality was affirmed 
post-Charter in R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”]. Justices Gonthier and Binnie for the majority state:  
The protection of vulnerable groups from self-inflicted harms does not, as Caine argues, 
amount to no more than “legal moralism”. Morality has traditionally been identified as a 
legitimate concern of the criminal law (Labatt Breweries, supra, at p. 933) although today 
this does not include mere ‘conventional standards of propriety’ but must be understood as 
referring to societal values beyond the simply prurient or prudish. … 
7
 See Patrick Devlin, “Morals and the Criminal Law” in The Enforcement of Morals 
(London, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), at 1; Patrick Devlin, “Morals and 
Contemporary Social Reality” in ibid., at 124; H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1966); H.L.A. Hart, “Immorality and Treason” in Richard A. Wasserstrom, 
ed., Morality and the Law (Belmont, CA.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971), at 48. The Hart-Devlin 
516 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
like Switzman v. Elbling8 and Roncarelli v. Duplessis9 that put the use of 
the penal law as an instrument of moral coercion at the centre of our 
constitutional consciousness. This paper is intended to begin to tell the 
story of this relationship between the constitutional protection of religion 
and the substantive criminal law, to offer some explanations for the relative 
silence surrounding the interaction of these two fields of law, and to 
demonstrate the way in which — and why — the issue is now re-emerging 
so powerfully. 
The first step in uncovering this story is to expose a line of Charter 
authority that, whether by invalidating, condoning or otherwise influencing 
substantive criminal law, has been concerned with the freedom and equality 
of religion. This is an important part of our criminal and constitutional 
legacy and will be addressed in Part II. Yet, at the same time, substantive 
criminal law under the Charter has weathered an attempt to dull the 
sharpness of the criminal law’s claims to the enforcement of a vision of 
the “good”. This trend has suppressed the potential tension between the 
criminal law and the constitutional protection of conscientious difference 
but, as Part III will demonstrate, fissures are opening up and the conceptual 
friction that I have described is starting to give off heat. I will conclude 
with some reflections on how to manage conflicts between the immutably 
normative dimensions of substantive criminal law and our collective 
commitment to the constitutional protection of religious conscience. 
II. RELIGION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN THE CHARTER ERA 
When inquiring into the interaction of an aspect of the Charter and 
an area of substantive law, there is an understandable tendency to engage 
a kind of flawed synecdoche. The analysis can readily and myopically 
turn exclusively to the constitutional provision in issue and, even more 
                                                                                                            
debate was, of course, influential in the decriminalization of homosexual conduct between consenting 
adults in 1969. 
8
 [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Switzman”]. 
9 
[1959] S.C.J. No. 1, [1959] S.C.R. 121 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Roncarelli”]. Although 
neither Switzman nor Roncarelli was a criminal or quasi-criminal case, both arose out of situations 
in which governments attempted to use the force of the penal law for deeply normative ends. Given 
that both were decided in a pre-Charter era, the protection of conscience in Switzman and religion 
in Roncarelli were cast in terms of division of powers and the limits of executive conduct under the 
rule of law, respectively. Given the factual matrix out of which they arise — the prohibition of 
expression of communist ideas and the imprisonment of Jehovah’s Witnesses for distributing 
literature — the constitutional significance of both cases is strongly gilded by the broader question of 
the use of penal law to enforce moral views. 
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narrowly, to those instances in which a substantive law was challenged 
as contravening the specific provision in question. The provision itself 
thereby comes to stand as an emblem for the whole of the “constitutional” 
impact of a given rights protection. In this way, interested in whether 
associational rights have affected the criminal law, we look only to those 
cases in which a claim was made that a criminal law breached section 2(d); 
or, interested in the impact of the Charter protection of equality on the 
criminal law, we search for those criminal provisions that have been the 
subject of a section 15(1) analysis. The presence of a Charter protection 
has, however, far broader impact on substantive law than this narrow 
focus on the direct application of a constitutional right would suggest.10 
This is certainly true of the influence of section 2(a) or religious 
equality on substantive criminal law. To be sure, those cases in which a 
criminal law is ruled constitutionally valid or invalid on the basis of 
section 2(a) are important instances to consider when assessing the 
influence of the constitutional protection of religious conscience on the 
criminal law. Indeed, it was through this kind of application in the criminal 
law arena that section 2(a) received its first and still most influential 
elucidation. But to begin to tell the story of religious freedoms and 
criminal law calls for a more expansive gaze. In addition to those cases 
in which the criminal law has been viewed as a threat to religion, there 
are important ways in which the substantive criminal law has been used 
as facilitative or protective of religious freedom and equality. In these 
instances, aspects of the criminal law have derived principled support 
from the existence of the constitutional protections of religion, even if 
the Charter was not directly applied. Finally, there are certain instances 
in which the constitutional presence of religious freedom and equality 
has been used as a resource in the interpretation of criminal laws that have 
only occasional or incidental impact on religious freedom and equality. 
These three categories differ in terms of the means and directness of 
legal impact, but all are united in disclosing a conceptually intimate 
relationship between substantive criminal law and the constitutional 
protection of religious conscience. 
                                                                                                            
10
 For the kind of expansive reading of the influence of a constitutional right’s impact on 
the criminal law for which I am advocating, in this case Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
s. 15(1), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11, see Christine Boyle, “The Role of Equality in Criminal Law” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. 203. 
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1. Criminal Law and Substantive Constitutionality 
Turning first to those instances in which the substance of criminal or 
quasi-criminal law has been tested against the protection of religious 
freedom and equality, one is immediately met with the jurisprudential 
Goliath that still stands at the gateway of not only religious freedoms but 
the modern approach to the interpretation and application of the Charter, 
more generally. Given that it established the purposive approach to 
interpreting the Charter, declared the Charter’s sensitivity to both purpose 
and effect, articulated the doctrine of shifting purpose, and laid the soil 
from which the law of section 2(a) would grow, it is easy to forget that 
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.11 is part of the corpus of post-Charter 
criminal and quasi-criminal jurisprudence. Chief Justice Dickson broke 
from the precedent established in R. v. Robertson,12 by holding that the 
use of penal legislation to enforce a Christian conception of the Sabbath 
was inconsistent with the core value pursued by section 2(a) of the Charter: 
“the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the 
right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or 
reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice 
or by teaching and dissemination”.13 Chief Justice Dickson explained 
that this kind of freedom entails the absence of both constraint and 
coercion, with coercion including not only “such blatant forms of  
compulsion as direct commands to act or refrain from acting on pain of 
sanction” but also “indirect forms of control which determine or limit 
alternative courses of conduct available to others”.14 The summary 
conviction offence at issue in Big M offended the goods protected by 
section 2(a) by “bind[ing] all to a sectarian Christian ideal”, thereby 
working “a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the 
dignity of all non-Christians”.15 Given its objectionable purpose, the law 
could not be saved by section 1. 
Big M is, thus, an instance of section 2(a) being used to invalidate 
penal legislation in the name of protecting religious freedom. Although 
Big M would have foundational impact on the interpretation of the 
Charter as a whole, as well as on the concept of religious freedom 
embodied in section 2(a), it is worth noting the particular manner in 
                                                                                                            
11
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
12
 [1963] S.C.J. No. 62, [1963] S.C.R. 651 (S.C.C.). 
13
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (S.C.C.).  
14
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336-37 (S.C.C.). 
15
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.). 
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which Dickson C.J.C.’s analysis in the case was influenced by and, as such, 
spoke directly and meaningfully to the very nature of criminal law. First, 
Dickson C.J.C. spoke specifically of the evil of this legislation being the 
attempt to use “the force of the state” to bind all individuals to “values 
rooted in Christian morality”.16 This objection to the conjunction of 
particular moral claims and “the force of the state” — with a specifically 
articulated concern for “direct commands to act or refrain from acting 
on pain of sanction”17 — is an objection that drives to the core of the 
criminal law, the most coercive means at the disposal of the state for  
enforcing a normative conception of social conduct. In this way, the 
very casting of the issue in Big M invites the question of the relationship 
between religious freedom and criminal law outlined in the introduction to 
this paper. Yet there is a degree of ambivalence in the judgment disclosed 
by the second way in which Big M spoke interestingly and directly to 
the criminal law. Chief Justice Dickson articulated a principled limit on 
the scope of religious freedom, stating that the freedom contemplated in 
section 2(a) was “subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others”.18 The reference to the parallel rights and freedoms 
of others portends the conflict of rights jurisprudence that would become 
the signal feature of religious liberties jurisprudence;19 but it is the first 
half of the sentence that is of most interest for present purposes. This list 
of interests mirrors the list of permissible bases for the use of the 
federal criminal law power: “public peace, order, security, health and 
morality”.20 These matters — public safety, order, health and morals — 
are both the limits of religious freedom and the permissible uses of the 
criminal law power. Although unelaborated by the Court, there is here a 
seed of recognition that the nature of the criminal law is tightly imbricated 
with religious freedom. On the one hand, given its intrinsic permeability to 
morality and inherently coercive form, criminal law poses the quintessential 
threat to the freedoms guaranteed in section 2(a). On the other hand, the 
freedoms guaranteed in section 2(a) will be subject to limitation on bases 
                                                                                                            
16
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.). 
17
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.). 
18
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.).  
19
 See, e.g., Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 
S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trinity Western”]; Chamberlain v. Surrey 
School District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.).  
20
 Labatt Brewing Co. v. Canada, [1979] S.C.J. No. 134, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 914, at 933 (S.C.C.). 
See also R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 77 (S.C.C.). 
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identical to the legitimate ends of criminal law. The Court’s subsequent 
ruling upholding Sunday closing laws as justified infringements on section 
2(a) confirmed that the boundary between criminal legislation and religious 
freedom would be a fraught one, largely contested within the terms of 
section 1.21 
Cases exploring the constitutionality of criminal and quasi-criminal 
legislation in light of religious freedoms and equality can be found at all 
levels of Canadian courts. Certain cases have addressed the constitutionality 
of truancy laws in light of religious freedoms,22 an issue that evocatively 
recalls the dark pre-Charter history of the use of the criminal law against 
the Doukhobours of the B.C. interior.23 Other cases have addressed freedom 
of religion as it applies to the quasi-criminal regulation of hunting and 
Aboriginal spiritual life.24 The identification doctrine found in the realm 
of corporate criminal liability has even been challenged as contrary to 
section 2(a) when used to incriminate a religious organization.25 Allow 
me to draw out in somewhat greater detail two examples of the courts 
dealing with claims that criminal or quasi-criminal laws are invalid as 
offensive to religious freedom. 
The first, R. v. S. (M.),26 is interesting both in that it, like Big M,27 
involves an argument about freedom from religion and also because the 
Court makes particularly overt claims about the interaction among criminal 
law, religious freedom, and moral judgment. In R. v. S. (M.), the accused 
challenged the constitutionality of section 155 of the Criminal Code,28 
the incest provision. Among his various grounds was the argument that 
the rule against incest is a religiously based prohibition arising from 
Jewish and Christian principles that he did not share and that, as such, it 
constituted religious coercion through the criminal law. Justice Donald’s 
rejection of this argument, though unceremonious, powerfully expressed 
a view of the legitimate ambit of the criminal law, a scope that necessarily 
                                                                                                            
21
 R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.). 
22
 See, e.g., R. v. Jones, [1986] S.C.J. No. 56, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 (S.C.C.).  
23
 See John P.S. McLaren, “The Doukhobor Belief in Individual Faith and Conscience and 
the Demands of the Secular State” in John McLaren & Harold Coward, eds., Religious Conscience, 
the State, and the Law: Historical Contexts and Contemporary Significance (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1999), at 117. 
24
 R. v. Jack, [1985] S.C.J. No. 63, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332 (S.C.C.). 
25
 R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1997] O.J. No. 1548, 116 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 
26
 [1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.). 
27
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
28
 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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implied limits on conscience-based objections to the application of the 
criminal law: 
I think this argument is utterly specious. The criminal law fundamentally 
deals with right and wrong. The Criminal Code gives expression to 
our society’s moral principles. Section 155 seeks to prevent the harm 
to individuals and to the community caused by incest. The fact that the 
offence is rooted in a moral principle developed within a religious 
tradition cannot support a claim for interference with the freedom to 
believe or not to believe under the Charter.29 
The other case of unique interest is R. v. Morgentaler.30 The case is 
remembered and treated primarily as a section 7 fundamental justice 
case but it must be recalled that the challenge to section 251 of the 
Criminal Code31 was also framed as a challenge based on section 2(a) of 
the Charter. Given that the case ultimately turned on the section 7 question 
and that both Dickson C.J.C. and Beetz J. declined to address the section 
2(a) argument,32 it is not surprising that this dimension of the case is often 
overlooked. Yet Wilson J., in reasons that have since grown in influence 
and jurisprudential impact, gave an important place to the analysis  
of freedom of religion and conscience in the constitutional review of 
substantive criminal law. Justice Wilson embedded her consideration of 
section 2(a) within an overarching section 7 analysis, reasoning that  
“a deprivation of the section 7 right which has the effect of infringing a 
right guaranteed elsewhere in the Charter cannot be in accordance with 
the principles of fundamental justice”.33 She held that the deprivation of 
section 7 occasioned by section 251 offended section 2(a) of the Charter 
“because . . . the decision whether or not to terminate a pregnancy is 
essentially a moral decision, a matter of conscience”34 and that the 
conscience at issue in cases of abortion is the conscience of each individual 
woman. Justice Wilson invoked Dickson C.J.C.’s discussion of freedom 
of conscience in Big M35 and went on to note that “conscientious beliefs 
which are not religiously motivated are equally protected” by section 2(a). 
                                                                                                            
29
 R. v. S. (M.), [1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467, at 483-84 (B.C.C.A.). 
30
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. 
31
 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
32
 Even the dissent dealt only passingly with Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,  
s. 2(a), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 156 (S.C.C.).  
33
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 175 (S.C.C.). 
34
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 175-76 (S.C.C.). 
35
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
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“[T]he role,” she argued, “of the state in a democracy is to establish the 
background conditions under which individual citizens may pursue the 
ethical values which in their view underlie the good life.”36 In this case, 
the criminal law was a threat to the liberty of citizens to pursue their visions 
of the good life. 
R. v. S. (M.)37 and Wilson J.’s reasoning in R. v. Morgentaler38 
demonstrate the flip sides of the coin at issue when criminal laws are 
challenged as contrary to section 2(a). On the one side one finds the moral 
freedom represented by section 2(a) and, on the other, the moral regulation 
inherent in the criminal law. Such cases, taking their cue from Big M,39 
involve a sense of the threat that the criminal law poses to religion, but 
also a recognition of the socially constitutive force of the criminal law. 
2. The Criminal Law as a Means to Religious Freedom and 
Equality 
The impact of section 2(a) of the Charter on substantive criminal law 
is felt most directly and, hence, appears most robustly in the jurisprudence 
in cases that conform to the liberal model of negative rights: the 
government acts as the singular antagonist of the individual and the 
individual seeks — sometimes successfully, sometimes not — to repel 
the coercive power of the state by invoking freedom of religion and 
conscience. This is the picture of freedom and of rights painted in Big M40 
and is the most apparent way in which the constitutional protection of 
religious freedom and equality has affected the criminal law. The presence 
of section 2(a) and the protection of religion in section 15(1) have had, 
however, more structurally positive, though less obvious, influences on 
substantive Canadian criminal law. In particular, there is a narrow range 
of aspects of contemporary criminal law that reflects the very different 
image of criminal law as a tool to secure and to facilitate the enjoyment 
of religious freedom and equality. In these instances, aspects of criminal 
law are either supported by or consciously crafted to protect religious 
conscience. 
                                                                                                            
36
 R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 178 (S.C.C.). 
37
 [1996] B.C.J. No. 2302, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 467 (B.C.C.A.). 
38
 [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). 
39
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
40
 R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.). 
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A fine example of a substantive criminal law that draws support 
from the protection of religious freedom and equality is the prohibition 
on hate speech found in section 319 of the Criminal Code.41 The offence 
prohibits the wilful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups. As  
a limitation on the scope of permitted expression, the provision was 
challenged in R. v. Keegstra42 as contrary to freedom of expression. Mr. 
Keegstra was a teacher in Eckville, Alberta, who taught his pupils that 
Jews were “treacherous”, “subversive”, “sadistic”, and that they sought 
to destroy Christianity. He also taught them that the Holocaust was 
fabricated by the Jews to gain sympathy and that the Jewish people were 
responsible for many of the ills of the world. 
In reviewing the history of hate propaganda legislation, Dickson 
C.J.C. emphasized the historical link between hate-speech laws and the 
suppression of anti-Semitic and Nazi propaganda, and identified the 
objective of section 319 as the prevention of discrimination against and 
harms to the dignity of minority groups, as well as the avoidance of a 
social message insidiously promoting a sense of the “racial or religious 
inferiority”43 of some members of the community. In upholding the limit 
on expressive rights as justified under section 1, Dickson C.J.C. drew 
support for the provision from sections 15 and 27 of the Charter, which 
reflect a “strong commitment to the values of equality and multiculturalism, 
and hence underline the great importance of Parliament’s objective in 
prohibiting hate propaganda”.44 In particular, the criminal prohibition on 
hate speech was consistent with the recognition “that Canada possesses 
a multicultural society in which the diversity and richness of various 
cultural groups is a value to be protected and enhanced”.45 Section 319 
reflected Parliament’s legitimate choice to “reduce racial, ethnic and 
religious tension in Canada” by “suppress[ing] the wilful promotion of 
hatred against identifiable groups”.46 
The prohibition of hate speech thus stands as one example of a use 
of the substantive criminal law to attempt to protect and facilitate 
religious equality and freedom in Canada. The theory of such provisions 
is that true equality and meaningful liberty cannot be achieved in a 
society in which members of discrete minorities are subject to public 
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degradation and an atmosphere of legally abetted intolerance. On this 
view, the criminal law has a positive role to play in creating a tolerant, 
hospitable social environment conducive to the full recognition of the 
dignity of others. At no point in R. v. Keegstra47 did the Court invoke 
section 2(a) of the Charter, nor was this overtly treated as an instance of 
a “conflict of rights” of the form we have become used to seeing in the 
section 2(a) jurisprudence. Rather, in R. v. Keegstra we find an instance 
in which the criminal law is actively deployed as an instrument in the 
structuring of a public space in which religious and cultural diversity 
can flourish without fear or discrimination. This is an arena in which the 
Charter’s commitment to equality and multiculturalism — raised here in a 
case of religious and cultural intolerance — buttressed the constitutionality 
of an aggressive and highly contentious criminal law. 
In such cases, we are up against a somewhat different but no less 
interesting form of claim about the relationship between religion and  
the criminal law than we saw with challenges to the constitutionality of 
criminal laws on the basis of section 2(a). The majority decision in R. v. 
Keegstra48 drips with approval for the morally constructive use of the 
criminal law. As applied to religious freedom and tolerance of religious 
difference, this is an attempt to use the force of the criminal law to 
secure the normative difference that is characteristic of tolerance for 
religious cultures. This is fascinatingly precarious terrain for the criminal 
law to tread in a liberal democracy, as was made eminently clear in R. v. 
Zundel.49 Only two years after R. v. Keegstra, the majority of the Court 
invalidated section 181 of the Criminal Code,50 the false news provision. 
In a case involving the attempt to use the criminal law to limit the 
expression of virulent anti-Semitism, the majority found that, even if 
section 181 was designed to promote the kind of social and religious 
tolerance upon which the constitutionality of the statute in R. v. Keegstra 
turned, in this case the legislation failed at the proportionality stage. The 
reasoning found in Cory and Iacobucci JJ.’s spirited dissent is of most 
interest for present purposes. The dissenting justices emphasize that the 
provision in question “provides protection, by criminal sanction, not only to 
Jewish Canadians but to all vulnerable minority groups and individuals”.51 
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The argument for the use of the criminal law in the protection of religious 
freedom and equality could not have been made more sharply and 
passionately: 
The tragedy of the Holocaust and the enactment of the Charter have 
served to emphasize the laudable s. 181 aim of preventing the harmful 
effects of false speech and thereby promoting racial and social tolerance. 
In fact, it was in part the publication of the evil and invidious statements 
that were known to be false by those that made them regarding the 
Jewish people that [led] the way to the inferno of the Holocaust. The 
realities of Canada’s multicultural society emphasize the vital need to 
protect minorities and preserve Canada’s mosaic of cultures.52 
Again, one does not find a direct application of the right to freedom 
of religion or religious equality in this dissent. Instead, one finds a 
strident defence of a substantive criminal law that draws support from 
the ethic of religious freedom and tolerance reflected in the Charter. 
The laws prohibiting hate speech and false news are emblematic of 
this second relationship between the constitutional protection of religious 
liberties and the substantive criminal law. Similar sentiments can be found 
in other, less visibly and hotly debated, aspects of contemporary criminal 
law. For example, Parliament’s statement of the principles of sentencing 
includes a direction that the fact that a crime was motivated by religious 
bias, prejudice or hate should be treated as an aggravating factor. Although 
not conventionally thought of as an aspect of substantive criminal law, 
such sentencing directions are reasonably conceived of as normative 
“riders” on substantive laws, outlining the circumstances of an offence 
that ought to attract particular social disapprobation. No doubt enacted 
for historical reasons unlinked to notions of expansive religious tolerance, 
other examples of this affirmative use of the criminal law can nevertheless 
be found in certain substantive criminal offences that specifically protect 
religious gatherings and the conduct of religious ceremonies.53 Furthermore, 
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in 2001, Parliament amended section 430 of the Criminal Code,54 adding 
subsection (4.1): 
 (4.1) Every one who commits mischief in relation to property that 
is a building, structure or part thereof that is primarily used for religious 
worship, including a church, mosque, synagogue or temple, or an 
object associated with religious worship located in or on the grounds 
of such a building or structure, or a cemetery, if the commission of the 
mischief is motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on religion, 
race, colour or national or ethnic origin, 
(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding ten years; or 
(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding eighteen 
months. 
Speaking to this provision before Parliament, Ms Sarmite Bulte, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage, characterized 
this as a “very serious offence” that was designed to “better protect from 
hatred those who have become vulnerable because they belong to a group 
distinguished by factors such as race, religion or ethnic origin”.55 The 
facilitative role of the criminal law with respect to religious freedom 
was most apparent when Ms Bulte explained that the government’s chief 
concern was that “[s]uch mischief would create fear among worshippers 
of a specific religion and divert them from the practise of their religion”.56 
In all of these cases, the substantive criminal law, though not directly 
subject to Charter scrutiny, derives support and authority from the 
constitutional protection of religious conscience. This is a less visible, 
though no less significant, influence of religious freedom and equality 
on the substantive criminal law. 
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3. The Constitutional Protection of Religion as an Interpretive 
Resource in the Criminal Law 
This last category of possible influences of the constitutional protection 
of religion on the criminal law involves neither claims that criminal 
laws interfere with religious liberty or equality nor arguments garnering 
support for criminal laws from constitutional commitments to religious 
diversity and equality. Instead, what I have in mind are those ways in 
which the constitutional protection of religion might be seen to influence 
the judicial interpretation and construction of those myriad criminal law 
concepts that rely upon assumptions about what is of social value, what 
affects our perception of events, and what moulds our reactions to the 
events that take place in the world, rendering them subjectively genuine or 
objectively reasonable, as the case may be. This arena of subtle influence 
has, perhaps, the greatest potential for impact on the day-to-day application 
of the criminal law but is, as yet, the least judicially explored. 
Though an evidence case, R. v. Gruenke57 provides an example of 
this kind of interpretive influence of the constitutional protection of 
religion. In that case, the majority of the Court concluded that, although 
a class privilege for religious communications was not required by virtue 
of section 2(a), a case-by-case privilege for religious communications 
could be recognized when “the individual’s freedom of religion [would] 
be imperilled by the admission of the evidence”.58 Chief Justice Lamer 
reasoned that the appropriate means of taking account of section 2(a) in 
the application of the common law of evidence was to allow the case-
by-case criteria, or “Wigmore factors”, to “be informed . . . by the Charter 
guarantee of freedom of religion”.59 What we see here is the application 
and interpretation of the common law being influenced by the presence 
of the Charter protection of religious freedom; this is so independently 
of the rule that the common law should be developed in keeping with 
those more general, elusive and protean “Charter values”.60 Though it is 
drawn from the realm of criminal evidence, R. v. Gruenke shows with 
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clarity and transparency the manner in which the interpretation of common 
law tests is influenced by the constitutional protection of religion. 
As Christine Boyle argued in her 1994 article assessing the role of 
equality in criminal law, the principal locus for this kind of soft interpretive 
effect of a Charter right on substantive criminal law is in the criminal 
law’s use of objective “reasonableness” tests.61 It is now perhaps trite to 
observe that whenever the law employs the “reasonable person” as a 
diagnostic for determining acceptable conduct, it relies upon a fiction 
constructed with assumptions and judgments about normativity. In a 
society committed to multiculturalism and religious pluralism, the issue 
thus arises: is the reasonable criminal law actor a religious person? Do the 
beliefs, commitments and world views that comprise religious conscience 
have relevance when assessing whether a person acted reasonably? And, 
in particular, does the presence of the Charter protection of religious 
freedom in section 2(a) and religious equality in section 15(1) guarantee 
to the citizen that this should be so? 
These questions are, in my view, one of the frontiers in thinking 
about the relationship between the constitutional protection of religion 
and the substantive criminal law. This is an area in which we are 
beginning to witness the seed planted by Dickson C.J.C. in Big M62 — 
the creeping recognition that the morality pursued by the criminal law may 
circumscribe the moral freedom guaranteed by section 2(a) — coming to 
fruition. Crimes that involve objective forms of mens rea and defences 
that test the accused’s conduct against that of a “reasonable person” all 
potentially raise this question of how to conceive of the objective actor 
and the impact, if any, of section 2(a) on the construction of this 
hypothetical subject. One imagines, for example, the adjudication of a 
claim of necessity or duress being informed by a religiously or culturally 
influenced sense of the range of “reasonable alternatives”.63 As I will 
demonstrate below, the fraught law of provocation shows that the 
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imaginative leap required is a small one. Indeed, the legitimacy of taking 
account of the religious beliefs of an accused who claims to have been 
provoked to kill is a live issue in substantive criminal law, largely because 
the beliefs that form the basis of these claims grate so powerfully against 
what should be our fierce commitment to gender equality. In this respect, 
the “soft” influence of religious freedom on the substantive criminal law 
puts us squarely against the hard issue that I suggested is coming to 
characterize the relationship between criminal law and the constitutional 
protection of religion: when does the moral liberty assured by section 
2(a) give way to the moral imperatives of society at large as reflected 
and enforced by criminal law? 
III.  RELIGION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW AT ODDS 
Thus far, I have shown that there is a story to be told about  
the relationship between the constitutional protection of religion and 
substantive Canadian criminal law. This relationship has been more or 
less subtle and has demanded some excavation to reveal. This story has 
been an interesting one, in part, because it has disclosed different faces 
of an interplay between the socially constructive ends of the criminal 
law and religion/religious liberty as an object of social construction. 
When the influence of sections 2(a) and 15(1) of the Charter has taken 
the form of arguments for the constitutional invalidity of criminal law,  
I have argued that the underlying dynamic is one wherein the moral 
freedom suggested by the protection of religious conscience has been 
tested against the morally constitutive role of substantive criminal law. 
The second form of influence — the use of the constitutional protection 
of religious freedom and equality as a resource from which to draw 
support for criminal laws — has inverted this dynamic, snapping the 
normative force of the criminal law squarely behind and in aid of the moral 
and cultural diversity sought by religious freedom and equality. When 
the law is called upon to interpret and apply the quotidian concepts of 
substantive criminal law with religious freedoms in mind, which of 
these two dynamics will prevail is a question left open: will concepts such 
as “reasonableness” be an instrument of circumscription, as suggested in 
Big M,64 or is this precisely the place at which the arguments for a 
religiously inclusive sense of “ordinary” lived experience is most pressing? 
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Once this charged dynamic at play in the relationship between 
substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection of religion has 
been uncovered, it appears somewhat remarkable that there has been  
so little jurisprudential and scholarly debate on this area of Criminal-
Constitutional law. Despite the social crucible that this dynamic represents, 
since Big M,65 principled engagements with the difficult issues that 
characterize the interaction between substantive criminal law and religion 
have been comparatively few. In those cases in which this interaction 
has been addressed, the issues have not been cast as I have suggested 
and the stakes that I have described have not been explicitly drawn out 
for scrutiny and discussion. 
But the ground now seems to be shifting. Cases are emerging in 
which claims of religious freedom and equality are putting hard questions 
to substantive criminal law. I want to look particularly to two contemporary 
examples, both of which show a slightly different face of the surfacing 
moral dynamic that subtends this relatively unexamined area. Before 
doing so, a word or two is in order about why this issue, largely dormant 
for so long, has now become so volatile. Why is it that, in the past few 
years, we are seeing so much more clearly the fraught entanglement of 
the protection of religious liberties and the substantive criminal law? 
1. Accounting for the Awakening 
It is an inherently perilous undertaking to attempt to provide causative 
explanations for the emergence of legal issues at a given point in the 
jurisprudential life of a country. Furthermore, satisfying explanations 
are more likely to lie in the mouths of social historians rather than 
theorists of constitutional and criminal law. Nevertheless, as one looks 
at this incipiently fraught relationship between substantive criminal law 
and the constitutional protection of religious liberties, certain trends in 
the law on both sides of the aisle are, at minimum, suggestive of why the 
provocative moral dynamic that exists between these two areas at the 
level of theory seems to be manifesting in lived reality. 
Over the last 15 years or so, substantive criminal law has weathered 
something of a muting of its moral urgency. Viewed against this trend, 
R. v. S. (M.)66 is precisely an interesting case because Donald J.’s unabashed 
assertion that the criminal law “gives expression to our society’s moral 
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principles” stands firmly against the main current of judicial statements 
about the nature of criminal law in the Charter era. In a number of 
dimensions of substantive criminal law, the courts have sounded a 
general retreat from more overt forms of the claim that, whatever else it 
is also doing, the criminal law is essentially engaged in communicating 
and enforcing societal norms. To be sure, the courts have confirmed, not 
resiled from, the facial legal position that a valid criminal law may 
pursue moral ends, the position reflected in Rand J.’s definition of the 
criminal law power articulated in the Margarine Reference.67 Indeed, in 
R. v. Malmo-Levine,68 the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed this 
definition of the Federal criminal law power as it nominally rejected the 
notion that the harm principle — that classic liberal block on morals 
legislation — was a principle of fundamental justice.69 I say “nominally” 
because, despite its statements about the legitimacy of morals regulation, 
the Court in R. v. Malmo-Levine ultimately leaned on the existence of 
harm and, in doing so, fell into line with the general pattern in the 
contemporary interpretation of the criminal law. This pattern is most 
apparent in the realm of indecency and obscenity, areas of substantive 
criminal law whose application seems to call most plainly for a kind of 
case-by-case moral judgment. Yet even in this most overtly moral of 
criminal arenas, the recent case of R. v. Labaye70 has marked the 
culmination of a transformation of the standard for both obscenity and 
indecency “from a community standards test to a harm-based test”.71 
The test for indecency and obscenity now “amounts to a test of harm 
incompatible with society’s proper functioning”.72 
Of course, as the Court itself accepted in R. v. Malmo-Levine,73 the 
substitution of harm for community standards does not eradicate the 
moral content of criminal law but, rather, leaves it to the second-order 
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question of what “counts” as a harm.74 Although the majority in R. v. 
Labaye suggests the solution that the harm must be “grounded in norms 
which our society has formally recognized in its Constitution or similar 
fundamental laws”,75 this answer really just begs the question that I am 
identifying as key to contemporary thinking on this side of the religion-
criminal law equation: what are the appropriate limits of the criminal law? 
As a device of moral enforcement, the criminal law is powerfully illiberal;76 
yet we live under the profound ethical influence of a quintessentially 
liberal document, the Charter. Courts have been caught in the resulting 
cross-currents. As a result, whether by opting for more objective-sounding 
language of harm in criminal offences or by attempting to extract the 
question of moral blame from the law of criminal defences,77 courts 
have attempted to shuffle the overtly moral dimensions of the criminal 
law to the next room like that bilious old uncle at a family gathering. 
Doing so, however, has merely emphasized the gap between the irreducibly 
moral components of the criminal law and the normatively cleansed 
reasoning found in criminal judgments. Faced with this gap, serious 
thought is again being given to the moral limits of the criminal law.78 
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A notably parallel set of questions is being asked in the realm of the 
constitutional protection of religion. Looked at from within the culture 
of Canadian constitutionalism, religion appears primarily as a matter of 
individual flourishing and an expression of autonomy and choice.79 
Operating with this understanding of religion in hand, the Court has 
recently adopted an unprecedentedly expansive reading of section 2(a), 
holding that it protects against all non-trivial interferences with the 
sincerely held faith-based convictions of an individual, irrespective of 
the views of any larger community of belief.80 This construction of section 
2(a) ensures that the courts will not be put in a position of having to judge 
the authenticity or merit of religious belief or the inherent acceptability 
of religious practice. With this holding, the Court has also sidelined the 
question of internal limits on freedom of religion, a question that has 
troubled the Court’s section 2(a) jurisprudence since an inherent limit 
was first implied in Big M.81 But this move away from internal limits also 
became something of a case of jumping out of the frying pan and into the 
fire. However justifiable, this expansive protection of religious conscience 
means that all questions of religious freedom raised under section 2(a) 
effectively become issues of justified state limitation under section 1 of 
the Charter. Furthermore, as a prohibited ground of discrimination listed 
in section 15(1) of the Charter, religion, like other identity-based grounds, 
is entitled to the respect of the state and equal protection and benefit of 
the law. Yet religious identity is, in certain important ways, distinct from 
many other forms of identity.82 Definitionally cultural, religion not only 
shapes one’s sense of self and community, but also shapes beliefs and 
motivates action. The demand to give equal protection to a world view 
complete with beliefs and practices — some of which might grate strongly 
against law’s own symbolic commitments, including its sense of authority 
and value — raises its own unique challenges and poses sharply the 
question of limits on religious tolerance. 
The world in which the law now operates is, of course, also one 
characterized by deep religious diversity of a form not felt even when 
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Big M83 was decided. Furthermore, as both Chamberlain84 and the academic 
commentary attest, conceptions of secularism have become increasingly 
contested and the assignation of religion to private life has proven unstable. 
Some religious communities are making claims to increased legal self-
determination, while others are calling out and objecting to the felt -
oppressiveness of constitutional liberalism. Many of the legal cases that 
have emerged as a result have taken the juridical form of a conflict of 
rights or Charter values, most frequently pitting religious freedom against 
the powerful constitutional commitment to equality and autonomy. Such 
cases have put into question the aesthetically desirable but pragmatically 
implausible claim that there is no hierarchy of rights, while forcing deep 
public thought about the nature of our commitment to various constitutional 
goods and the lengths to which we will go to protect them. The legal 
analysis of religious freedom has, thus, shifted attention increasingly to 
the question of how to manage conflicts of rights and how to conceive 
of the limits of religious freedom. Indeed, from Trinity Western85 to 
Multani86 and the Same-Sex Marriage Reference87 the single question 
that has defined contemporary constitutional protection of religion under 
the Charter has been that of defining the limits of religious freedom. 
In the end, then, when one looks at the modern fixations of both the 
substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection of religion, it 
seems hardly surprising that these two areas would soon meet. At the 
same time that the criminal law has become a site for debate about the 
limits of moral regulation, the question that has occupied thought in the 
realm of religious freedoms and equality is the question of the justified 
limits on normative difference. These questions are contesting the same 
boundary from different sides. Both questions are interested in the capacity 
of the law to make moral judgments and impose them upon those who 
might not agree with or conform to those judgments. Both questions put 
liberal public law in the uncomfortable position of having to confront its 
willingness to be illiberal. It is only very recently that these interesting 
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convergent questions have crystallized across this as-yet relatively untested 
boundary. Now that they have, in the words of Henry V, the game is afoot. 
2. A Preliminary Note: The Charter as False Comfort 
Before turning to two examples that display this moral dynamic at play 
in the interaction of the constitutional protection of religion and the 
substantive criminal law, a general comment is in order about the role of 
the Charter and Charter reasoning in such cases. 
In his important book on the role of moral principles in the conduct of 
constitutional self-government in the United States, Christopher Eisgruber 
identifies certain fallacies that plague the interpretation of constitutional 
law and, in so doing, impede our capacity to see clearly the stakes of 
and nature of constitutional law and reasoning.88 The “aesthetic fallacy” 
inheres in the belief that a constitution is coherent, non-redundant and 
rationally consistent.89 Instead, he argues, judges should recognize that 
the constitution reflects a set of political compromises and, as such, leaves 
gaps and contains inconsistencies. To this, I would add the consequential 
observation that the aesthetic fallacy prevents one from seeing that a 
constitution may generate as many conflicts as it appears to resolve. 
This last observation points to a way in which Canadian constitutional 
jurisprudence has laboured under something akin to the aesthetic fallacy. 
In so very many areas of Canadian law, an attempt is made to palliate 
moral contention by recourse to Charter rights or values. The admonition 
to develop the common law in keeping with Charter values is well 
established.90 More recently, the Court has held that the Charter itself 
“should be interpreted in a way that maintains its underlying values and 
its internal coherence”.91 Indeed, in R. v. Labaye,92 mentioned briefly above, 
McLachlin C.J.C. conceded the difficulty inherent in defining the types 
of harms cognizable in criminal indecency but sought to resolve this 
difficulty by answering that, to support a criminal conviction based on 
indecency, the harm must be “grounded in norms which our society has 
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formally recognized in its Constitution or similar fundamental laws”.93 
In so doing, she sought to resolve the second-order moral debate about what 
“counts” as harm by resort to the values enshrined in the Constitution.94 
There are two principal problems with advancing Charter rights and 
values as means of resolving moral disputes, the second more intractable 
than the first. Most obviously, this elevation of the Charter as not just a 
legal instrument but an expression of the core values of the community 
takes the scope and content of these values off the table for debate — 
they have already been decided and can be found in the Charter. But 
perhaps many are prepared, as I am, to engage in a defence of those values 
as just and good. The much more problematic aspect of this prevalent 
move brings us back to the aesthetic fallacy. The invocation of the Charter 
as a mechanism of resolving moral contention assumes a coherence within 
and among those values that simply does not exist. What are these elusive 
“Charter values”? In HEU, the Court listed “[h]uman dignity, equality, 
liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement  
of democracy” as among these values.95 Not only are these concepts 
tremendously porous and, thus, eminently open to the kind of normative 
contestation that the offer of the Charter as a device of resolution seeks 
to avoid, but there is ample room within these values, and in the variety 
of rights from which they flow, for claims that involve conflicting 
Charter values or (as we have so often seen in recent years) conflicting 
Charter rights. To give but the most patent example, the concepts of 
equality and liberty have certain fundamental cross-currents such that the 
claim that one must be protected readily provokes a claim that the other 
is being diminished. The point is that, rather than being resolved by the 
invocation of such values, the most difficult questions of constitutional and 
criminal law arise precisely when the content and interaction of rights and 
principles like “equality”, “autonomy” and “human dignity” are at issue. 
As much as anything else, the two examples of recent fraught 
intersections of the constitutional protection of religion and substantive 
criminal law that follow demonstrate how little recourse to the Charter 
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resolves. Almost any assertion of criminal misconduct involves claims 
that the autonomy, liberty, human dignity and equality of a victim or set 
of victims was harmed or put in jeopardy. The core rights and values found 
in the Charter are thus engaged. Equally, the threat of criminal sanction 
necessarily carries with it a threat to the autonomy, liberty, human dignity 
and, often, equality of the accused. Again, the core rights and values found 
in the Charter are thus engaged. When, as we find in these examples, 
religious freedom is on the table, the conundrum is further deepened. When 
it comes to normative debate, the Charter conjures much but resolves little. 
In this vein, the following examples demonstrate the way in which 
looking to the interaction of constitutional and criminal law can tell us a 
great deal about the nature of each. But, for present purposes, the most 
palpable lesson from the cases that follow is the way in which the 
intersection of substantive criminal law and religious liberties — with 
its inherent and evocative potential for cross-cutting claims about moral 
freedom — puts us uniquely and squarely against hard questions of 
genuine moral judgment. 
3. Religion and Provocation 
The first example of the extrusion of the moral dynamic between 
religious freedom and substantive criminal law that I offer arises in the 
modern crucible of criminal law — the working out of the balance 
between subjective fault and the criminal law’s demands for objectively 
reasonable conduct. The defence of provocation is an acutely problematic 
creature of history and necessity. Its history lies in the criminal law’s 
protection of norms of male honour and offence,96 a history that still 
plagues this defence’s disproportionate use to partially excuse male 
violence against women.97 Accordingly, the defence has been forcefully 
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attacked as a threat to gender equality in a number of ways, including its 
apparent condoning of sudden violence as an expected reaction to some 
forms of affront98 and the very narrow range of emotions that it has 
classically recognized as the basis for a partial excuse.99 Of course, 
nothing prevents the existence of provoking circumstances from being 
factored in when arriving at a just sentence — and herein lies its source 
in necessity. The provocation defence established in section 232 of the 
Criminal Code100 is, in many ways, best seen as a pseudo-sentencing 
provision whose real effect is to mitigate the potential harshness of the 
minimum sentences associated with murder. Indeed, the only effect of 
the defence of provocation is to reduce murder to manslaughter, thereby 
opening up the full range of sentencing options; otherwise put, provocation 
exists specifically and exclusively as a response to a minimum sentence 
for murder. Cogent arguments based on one or both of these features have 
been advanced to abolish or substantially revise the provocation defence. 
But the dimension of this defence that is of interest as a flashpoint 
for the moral dynamic between the constitutional protection of religion 
and the socially constructive role of the criminal law lies neither in history 
nor in necessity but, rather, in the analytic structure called for in assessing 
claims of provocation. In the law of provocation one finds an example 
of the third form of interaction of law and religion described above, the 
influence of the imperative of religious freedom and equality on the 
interpretation of basic criminal law concepts. Specifically, what effect, if 
any, should the religious belonging of an accused have on the construction 
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of the reasonable person? In R. v. Hill101 and R. v. Thibert,102 the Supreme 
Court of Canada has explained that a successful defence of provocation 
demands that three criteria be established: (1) that there was a wrongful act 
or insult sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control; (2) that 
the accused actually acted on this wrongful act or insult; and (3) that the 
killing happened “on the sudden and before there was time for passions 
to cool”. The contentious aspect of this test has been the first prong. In 
particular, in light of the statutory language demanding that the insult be 
sufficient to deprive an “ordinary person” of self-control, but given the 
countervailing imperative to treat culpability for murder as a matter of 
subjective fault,103 of what relevance are the personal characteristics of 
the accused? The Supreme Court has answered that the standard of self-
control must be a dominantly objective test, but that to properly assess 
the gravity of the insult, the ordinary person must “share with the accused 
such other factors as would give the act or insult in question a special 
significance”.104 
What no doubt appeared as but a sliver of subjectivity injected into 
the law of provocation has been driven open by the recently asked question 
of whether the cultural and, specifically, religious views of the accused 
should be considered in assessing the gravity of the insult.105 As argued 
above, this particular question is so explosive in the context of provocation 
because, unlike the kinds of attributes contemplated and used as examples 
by the Court in R. v. Thibert106 (race, primarily), religious belonging is a 
somewhat unique form of identity characteristic. That a person possesses 
the “feature” of being religious imports the possibility for a wide range 
of thickly normative assumptions about a just and good “order of things”, 
assumptions that will gild a given set of events with “special significance” 
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and will do so in a manner that puts value judgments at the core of the 
controversy.107 Provocation is already a normatively problematic defence. 
Yet if the beliefs and judgments that inform the accused’s perception of 
an act or insult as wrongful conflict with core public commitments, 
another layer of complexity is added. In such situations, the role of the 
criminal law in enforcing a moral vision is apparent and the consequent 
challenge is deciding where the line will be drawn between the moral 
coerciveness of criminal law and the moral freedom suggested by our 
commitment to religious pluralism. 
The two appellate courts that have recently taken up this question 
have adopted very different postures. In R. v. Nahar,108 the accused was 
charged with the murder of his wife. At trial, he argued that he was 
provoked by aspects of her behaviour, including her smoking, drinking 
and the fact that she socialized with other men. In particular, he claimed 
he was provoked because this behaviour was “completely at odds with 
the culture and tradition of the Sikh community in which they were 
raised”.109 He argued that, in the circumstances of the case, the ordinary 
person should be a person from that cultural background “to whom Ms. 
Nahar’s ongoing behaviour, and what she said and did immediately 
before Mr. Nahar stabbed her, would have been as significant as it was 
to Mr. Nahar”.110 Although the appeal from conviction was ultimately 
dismissed, the B.C. Court of Appeal agreed that the culture and/or 
religion of the accused is relevant to assessing the gravity of insult. 
Referring to Cory J.’s reasoning in R. v. Thibert,111 the Court concluded 
that “factors that give an act or insult a special significance could be 
said to include the implications of an accused person having been raised 
in a particular culture”.112 
Justice Doherty considered this issue in R. v. Humaid.113 In that case, 
the accused, who killed his wife, Aysar Abbas, claimed that he was 
provoked by a comment she made that he took to be an admission of 
                                                                                                            
107
 Value judgments in addition, that is, to the core judgment about the use of violence 
problematically and not-so-tacitly assumed in the very defence of provocation. As Murphy J., 
dissenting from the judgment of the Australian High Court, stated, “the ordinary or reasonable man 
simply does not kill if he is provoked” (R. v. Moffa (1976-77), 13 A.L.R. 225, at 244 (Aust. H.C.)). 
108
 [2004] B.C.J. No. 278, 20 C.R. (6th) 30 (B.C.C.A.). 
109
 R. v. Nahar, [2004] B.C.J. No. 278, 20 C.R. (6th) 30, at para. 2 (B.C.C.A.).  
110
 R. v. Nahar, [2004] B.C.J. No. 278, 20 C.R. (6th) 30, at para. 30 (B.C.C.A.). 
111
 R. v. Thibert, [1996] S.C.J. No. 2, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37 (S.C.C.). 
112
 R. v. Nahar, [2004] B.C.J. No. 278, 20 C.R. (6th) 30, at para. 34 (B.C.C.A.). 
113
 [2006] O.J. No. 1507, 37 C.R. (6th) 347 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2006] 
S.C.C.A. No. 232 (S.C.C.). 
(2008), 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) MORAL JUDGMENT, CRIMINAL LAW 541 
infidelity. Mr. Humaid, who was Muslim, had led expert evidence at trial 
to the following effect: 
Dr. Ayoub testified that the Islamic culture was male dominated and 
placed great significance on the concept of family honour. Infidelity, 
particularly infidelity by a female member of a family, was considered 
a very serious violation of the family’s honour and worthy of harsh 
punishment by the male members of the family.114 
The trial judge, however, had instructed the jury that they should not 
regard the ordinary person as sharing the accused’s religion, culture or 
customs. Justice Doherty found no error in this regard,115 reasoning that, 
in the absence of evidence specifically linking the accused to these sets 
of beliefs, to ascribe these characteristics to the accused “is an invitation 
to assign group characteristics to the appellant based on what can only be 
described as stereotyping”.116 Accordingly, he reasoned that, “[a]ssuming 
that an accused’s religious and cultural beliefs that are antithetical to 
fundamental Canadian values such as the equality of men and women 
can ever have a role to play”117 in the provocation analysis, the evidence 
adduced in this case could be of no assistance to the accused. 
Although he concluded that the issue of whether religious beliefs 
should be part of the legal construction of the ordinary person should be 
left to another case in which the issue squarely arose, Doherty J. did not 
leave the tone of skepticism in this last statement unexplored. In his 
obiter comments he expressed, in no uncertain terms, his view — 
contrary to that of the B.C. Court of Appeal — that the religious beliefs 
of an accused should be relevant in the assessment of provocation only 
when that religion or those beliefs are the very target of the wrongful act 
or insult. In so doing, he laid his finger on precisely the deep issue of 
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moral diversity versus moral enforcement raised by the intersection of 
religion and substantive criminal law: 
. . . It is arguable that as a matter of criminal law policy, the “ordinary 
person” cannot be fixed with beliefs that are irreconcilable with 
fundamental Canadian values. Criminal law may simply not accept that 
a belief system which is contrary to those fundamental values should 
somehow provide the basis for a partial defence to murder.118 
Of course, as I have argued above, the invocation of “fundamental 
Canadian values” marks, rather than eradicates, the essential issue raised 
by religion in the defence of provocation. The telling point, rather, is 
that beneath Doherty J.’s statement is a judgment about the role of the 
criminal law in forcefully pursuing our moral commitment to gender 
equality. Yet this question was already present before religion became 
an issue for the defence. As Kent Roach has observed, the defence of 
provocation already “embrace[s] as part of the ordinary person, a culture 
of masculinity that is possessive, short-tempered, and violent”.119 The 
general tendency, however, to focus upon the facially neutral concept of 
“loss of control” obscured the need to grapple with the moral function of 
the criminal law, a state of affairs that is much more comfortable in a 
liberal world. The entrance of religious diversity onto the criminal law 
scene crystallized the hard question about the justified moral reach of 
the criminal law and provoked this strident claim for the criminal law’s 
role in creating a common morality of gender equality. 
On the other side of the equation, the abstract ideal of moral 
diversity promised by the constitutional protection of religion, is happily 
embraced as a marker of any good liberal democracy. Yet, when mixed 
with substantive criminal law, the constitutional protection of religion 
must squarely face its own hard question: the limits of religious freedom 
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judgments” (Santo De Pasquale, “Provocation and the Homosexual Advance Defence: The Deployment 
of Culture as a Defence Strategy” (2002) 26.1 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 110, at 111).  
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and equality. Despite the Court’s expansive reading of the scope of section 
2(a), Dickson C.J.C.’s words in Big M begin again to echo in our ears: 
Freedom means that, subject to such limitations as are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of others, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary 
to his beliefs or his conscience.120 
The very context and structure of substantive criminal law forces the 
issue of this “subject to”. Recall that the language of “public safety, order, 
health, or morals” precisely echoes the valid purposes of the criminal 
law as outlined in the Margarine Reference121 and other cases. It is also 
always the case that allegations of criminality are predicated on alleged 
affronts to the parallel rights and freedoms of others and violations of 
the fundamental values entrenched in the Charter. Those who would 
approach religion in provocation in the way that Doherty J. did in R. v. 
Humaid122 are also, then, making deep claims about the legitimate scope 
of the criminal law — a judgment about the nature of religious freedom 
and equality and their interaction with other constitutional rights and 
values that, if defensible, is far from manifest. It is as though Dickson 
C.J.C.’s foundational statement about the limits of religious freedom 
predicted its interaction with the morally constructive force of the 
criminal law. 
4. Religion and Polygamy 
A second example of a recent appearance of the friction between the 
moral regulation inherent in the criminal law and the moral freedom 
suggested by the constitutional protection of religion is the emergence 
of questions concerning the criminal prohibition of polygamy. Whereas 
the example of provocation was an example of the way in which religious 
difference can raise issues about the construction of substantive criminal 
law concepts, the issue of polygamy revolves around the justifiability of 
a law criminalizing practices that might be motivated by religious beliefs. 
As such, this example is useful in drawing forward other aspects of the 
possible interaction between substantive criminal law and the constitutional 
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protection of religion, including the pivotal role that section 1 analyses 
will play. The polygamy issue is also a valuable focal point, however, 
because arguments in support of the criminal prohibition of polygamy 
are so encrusted with the attempt, discussed above, to bury the morally 
coercive nature of criminal regulation under a language of harm and 
harm-reduction. Even a light excavation of the debate lays bare, however, 
the fundamental moral dynamic that I have been pointing to in this paper. 
The debate around the criminal prohibition of polygamous 
relationships has most recently crystallized around the community of 
Bountiful, British Columbia.123 The members of this community in 
southeastern British Columbia belong to the Fundamentalist Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, a group whose polygamous lifestyle 
led to a fissure with the mainstream Mormon Church. For nearly 20 years, 
the B.C. Crown has struggled with the question of whether members of 
the community should be charged pursuant to section 293 of the Criminal 
Code,124 which creates an indictable offence for anyone practising, 
celebrating, assisting in, or otherwise being a party to “any form of 
polygamy”.125 In 1990, a police investigation of this community resulted 
in the recommendation that charges be laid under this provision. However, 
on the strength of legal opinions that section 293 would be struck down 
as an unconstitutional constraint on the religious liberties guaranteed  
in section 2(a) of the Charter, the Crown chose not to proceed. The 
community of Bountiful again came to the forefront of media and legal 
attention when, in 2006 and in response to allegations that adults in 
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 For a broad canvassing of various legal and social issues surrounding polygamy in Canada, 
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positions of “trust or authority” were engaging in sexual contact with 
young girls in the community, the RCMP recommended that individuals 
in Bountiful be charged with sexual exploitation, contrary to section 153 
of the Criminal Code. 
After Crown Counsel reviewed the evidence in the case and concluded 
that there was not a “substantial likelihood of conviction”, the Ministry 
of Attorney General appointed Mr. Richard Peck, Q.C., as a special 
prosecutor, tasked with reassessing the evidence and considering all 
potential criminal and quasi-criminal charges, including polygamy.126 
On August 1, 2007, the Criminal Justice Branch of the Ministry of 
Attorney General announced Mr. Peck’s recommendation. He agreed 
with the Crown’s earlier assessment of the evidence, found that none of 
a range of possible other offences were applicable, and recommended 
that the Attorney General refer the issue of the constitutionality of section 
293 of the Criminal Code127 to the B.C. Court of Appeal.128 In the summary 
of conclusions in his report to the Attorney General, Mr. Peck expressed 
the view that, given that “[r]eligious freedom in Canada is not absolute” 
but, rather, “subject to reasonable limits necessary to protect ‘public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others’”, there is a “good case for upholding s. 293 as compliant with 
the Charter”.129 
Mr. Peck is precisely correct, of course, that the issue of the 
criminalization of polygamy puts us squarely into the centre of Dickson 
C.J.C.’s statement in Big M130 about the limits of religious freedom. The 
courts that consider this issue will first have to ask whether there is a 
breach of section 2(a). Under the prevailing approach to freedom of 
religion, the breach seems evident: so long as polygamy is sincerely felt 
by the members of the community to be an aspect of their religious 
conscience, a criminalization of this practice is more than a trivial 
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interference and the breach of section 2(a) is, thus, made out. The result 
will turn entirely on whether the courts find that this limit on religious 
freedom can be demonstrably justified under section 1. Whatever the 
ultimate result, the polygamy issue is manifestly about the limits of the 
moral freedom suggested by section 2(a) of the Charter. 
However, as I have suggested in this paper, what is less obvious in 
the debate but no less true is that the issue also poses the difficult and 
uncomfortable question of the limits of the criminal law. Given the 
symbolic freight carried by the institution of marriage, a symbolic 
dimension made so manifest in the same-sex marriage debates, the 
assessment of the constitutionality of the crime of polygamy necessarily 
puts us in the liberally awkward position of contemplating the use of the 
most extreme force of the state to enforce a particular — and particularly 
powerful — view of ethical life. Part of the criminal law since before 
the first Criminal Code in 1892 and, to this day, listed alongside offences 
specifically concerned with the institution of marriage and provisions 
directed at abortion, libel, and hate propaganda, the criminal prohibition 
of polygamy is, at first blush, a matter of morality and social value. 
But as is so often the case when modern liberal society begins to 
blush at apparent moral regulation, there is a vigorous flight to the 
language of harm. This is particularly so in the case of Bountiful, given 
that the question of polygamy was raised in the context of allegations of 
sexual interference with children, a harm that the criminal law is justifiably 
confident in targeting.131 Yet questions of harm to children can be — 
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and, had there been sufficient evidence in this case, presumably would 
have been — addressed with other offences in the Criminal Code132 
specifically targeting this evil. Polygamy is no more inherently connected 
with the abuse of children than are other forms of family organization. 
To turn to a discussion of sexual harm to children is, in this sense, to 
sidestep the question of polygamy itself. 
Yet the section 1 analysis demands that the courts define the objective 
of the criminalization of polygamy and the prevention of harm will, no 
doubt, be raised as a candidate. To this end, the other form of harm that 
is invoked when the issue of polygamy is raised is harm to women. This 
claim can take one of two forms. The first is that women involved in 
polygamous relationships suffer a degree of physical and psychological 
harm that demands the criminalization of this form of family 
organization.133 However, this argument has an intrinsic overbreadth, 
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criminalizing possible loving, non-abusive polygamous marriages. To be 
sure, the question of the incidence of physical harms to women involved 
in polygamous relationships is a matter of the utmost concern for the 
criminal law. But, again, with sufficient evidence these types of harms can 
be addressed with prosecutions for more specifically tailored offences. It 
should be borne in mind that there is a long history and ample 
contemporary evidence of appalling rates of violence against women in 
the context of monogamous marriage, yet it is this abhorrent conduct, not 
this form of marriage, that has become the subject of the criminal law’s 
attention. 
The second form of harm to women that can be argued is a symbolic 
or communicative one and this form of harm, by contrast, maintains a 
requisite specificity around polygamy.134 This argument is that, in their 
very numerical and structural inequality, polygamous relationships that 
involve multiple wives send the message that women are less worthy of 
respect and concern, which, in turn, results in an attitudinal harm that 
damages gender equality at a broad social level.135 This is something of a 
familiar argument, found as it is in the jurisprudence surrounding indecency 
and obscenity. The equally familiar reply is to object that such an assertion 
denies that women in such relationships have full liberty or are able to 
make genuine choices.136 As I alluded to when discussing the internal 
contestability of Charter values, arguments about the need to protect the 
broad value of equality can nearly always be met with some form of 
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objection that appeals to the value of liberty. The point is not to deny the 
need to concern ourselves with communicative harms but, rather, that once 
abstracted to the level of harm to values, the debate becomes overtly and 
porously normative. 
With a return to normative judgment, we are left in much the same 
structural position as would have been the case had we taken the 
criminalization of polygamy for what it appears to be: a use of the 
criminal law to protect a cultural commitment to monogamous marriage, 
a commitment itself still deeply influenced by the norms of a particular 
Christian cultural milieu out of which, after all, section 293 itself 
historically emerged.137 Although one formulation of the issue is packaged 
in modern liberal terms, the issue remains whether or not it is legitimate 
to use the criminal law to enforce a particular normative vision and, in 
so doing, to limit the freedom to pursue a way of life predicated on a 
different moral outlook. Are we really so far from Dickson C.J.C.’s 
central concern in Big M — that this provision “takes religious values 
rooted in Christian morality and, using the force of the state, translates 
them into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers alike”138 
— or is it simply that a larger group of Canadians are less willing to 
compromise their symbolic and normative commitment to monogamous 
marriage than they are comfortable with stores being open on Sundays? 
That there are dimensions of meaningful difference between these two 
cases is certain. Yet whatever else is also going on, there is a robust 
dimension of moral coercion at play in the criminalization of polygamy, 
a kind of coercion that abrades the protection of a meaningful margin of 
moral appreciation implied in the constitutional protection of religious 
freedom and equality. However the question of the criminal prohibition 
of polygamy is resolved, the answer will be a response to this underlying 
tension. 
To be sure, both the prevailing way of talking about the criminal 
law and the force of constitutional analysis will seek to launder the issue 
of this underlying moral tension; issues of social value will be cast as 
questions of harm and minimal impairment. But the conjunction of crime, 
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sex, family and religion inherent in this issue makes this fundamental 
dynamic between moral judgment and moral freedom an unavoidable 
feature of public debate on this question, whether overtly identified or not. 
In this way, what makes polygamy such a provocative issue is that it 
exposes both the stubbornly moral inflection of our criminal law and 
certain limits on our tolerance for deep religious difference, two aspects 
of the culture of the Canadian rule of law that are so obviously salient 
but with which we are far from comfortable. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND THE  
CRIMINAL LAW 
In this paper I have sought to draw out something of a hidden 
relationship between the constitutional protection of religion and the 
substantive criminal law. I have endeavoured to demonstrate that, although 
comparatively little jurisprudential and scholarly attention has been devoted 
to this topic, there is, in fact, an interesting story to be told about the 
interaction of substantive criminal law and the constitutional protection 
of religion since the introduction of the Charter. In beginning to tell this 
story, I have pointed to three formal ways in which substantive criminal 
law has interacted with religious freedom and equality over the past 25 
years: a select number of cases have overtly tested substantive criminal 
laws against section 2(a) of the Charter; in certain instances substantive 
criminal law has been used in aid of the protection of religious freedom 
and equality; and in other, more subtle ways, the guarantee of religious 
freedom and equality has been a resource for the interpretation of 
substantive criminal law concepts. 
But more than simply narrating this story, I have been concerned 
with drawing out a simple but rich subtending dynamic between criminal 
law and religion in the Charter era. The constitutional protection of 
religion is, at its core, an offer of a certain moral freedom, whereas 
criminal law is irreducibly about moral regulation. In this respect, these 
two aspects of our legal culture reflect powerfully competing ethics in 
the modern liberal constitutional state. On the one hand, we are strongly 
dedicated to the idea that the state should remain agnostic on the kinds 
of basic value judgments made by individuals and groups in society. On 
the other hand, the criminal law is a forceful expression of some of the 
most essential moral judgments of dominant Canadian society. There is, 
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thus, a deeply provocative tension in this relationship between the 
constitutional protection of religion and substantive criminal law. 
This tension has lain largely unseen for much of the past 25 years. 
Part of the explanation for the hiddenness of this dynamic has been our 
devotion to two other stories that palliate the tension that I have tried to 
expose. In the Charter era, substantive criminal law has been increasingly 
talked about in the morally stripped language of harm. The story here is 
that, although no doubt at one time a vehicle of moral coercion, the 
criminal law has been unmoored from bare questions of value. The story 
about religious freedom and equality builds from this general way of 
thinking about state law and holds that, with only the most extreme and 
complex exceptions, under the Charter we have developed a relatively 
robust tolerance for the kind of lifestyle and value differences inherent 
in religious diversity. This is the story of legal multiculturalism and 
religious accommodation that is predicated on a sense of law as highly 
malleable and largely instrumental. In the result, we have two comforting 
stories that veil what I am pointing to as our agonal commitments to law 
— perhaps most particularly constitutional and criminal law — as an 
agent of moral freedom and of moral constraint. 
In recent years, however, cracks have been starting to appear in both 
of these stories, disturbing our comfort. I have pointed to two recent 
instances in which religious difference has clashed with substantive 
criminal law in a way that pushes this underlying moral dynamic to the 
forefront. When faced with issues like the role of religious difference in 
approaching the defence of provocation and the constitutionality of the 
polygamy offence, the friction between the moral force of the criminal 
law and the guarantee of moral liberty that inheres in section 2(a) produces 
a heat that cannot be ignored. And, despite the resulting discomfort, this 
is, to my eye, a good thing. These points of friction reveal much about 
both aspects of our legal culture and, thereby, encourage us to reason 
more honestly and more complexly about both the nature of the criminal 
law and the limits on religious freedom and equality, both of which are 
keenly felt, even if not spoken about. 
The tension that I have identified reflects a deep liberal ambivalence 
about the role of value in the law; indeed, it is an ambivalence reflected 
in the Charter itself, a document of great moral ambition but one that 
also reflects a concern for moral modesty. With increased religious 
diversity likely to raise this tension more frequently before the courts, 
what should be done? What jurisprudential posture should be taken? In 
truth, there is no legal “fix” to the dynamic I have identified; this is not a 
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tension that judges can dissipate with just the right judgment in a given 
case or a novel jurisprudential approach. But there is, nevertheless, a 
practical call implicit in my discussion. It is the call for transparency in 
what may be at stake in the meeting between religion and criminal law, 
and modesty in the use of the force of law. There is little basis to suspect 
that speaking in an uncritical language of harm and tolerance reduces 
moral conflict. On the other hand, there is ample basis to conclude that 
thus veiling the conflict prevents meaningful debate on the issues truly 
at stake. What we need in our jurisprudence is for judges to identify and 
speak to the importance of the values being pursued in the criminal law, 
to — where possible — stay criminal law’s violent hand in the imposition 
of these judgments and, in their reasons, to lay bare the broader social 
debate that must be had. 
 
